METHODOLOGY

The A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as the integration of different data, is appropriate for this study, as corruption and its causal relations are very difficult to measure and evaluate. The starting point will be the collection and analysis of existing official quantitative data related toen the Federal civil service, such as disciplinary actions and dismissals reports. Following on from this data, it will be made both descriptive and regression analyses will be conducted in order to identify the main patterns, as well as the correlations. In thea second phase, semi-structured interviews will help to capture the nuances that numbers are not necessarily able to show, regarding about anti-corruption mechanisms within the Brazilian Federal Executive. In short, this chapter will describe the mixed methods and mixed design approach chosen to conduct this study, taking into account its, efficial implications and limitations, of this study will also be taken into account in this section.

Mixed -method and design research

In order to minimise weaknesses and to <u>strengthen</u> bold the strength of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the integration of both methods <u>has</u> become a pre-eminent strategy in studies from different areas, mainly <u>in from the political</u> and social sciences (Johnson and Reynolds, 2008; Bryman, 2008; Plowright, 2011). As there are <u>-currently no statistics related to this issue</u>, <u>-such as a 'corruption rate'</u>, <u>-due to</u> the fact that corruption is neither et a steady phenomenone over time, <u>nor neither over jurisdictions</u> (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996), this study will triangulate government documents and existing qualitative statistics with primary quantitative information collected through interviews and conversations. Therefore, it will use <u>-a both a mixed -method</u> and design <u>approach</u> to look for a <u>more accurate indication of corruption</u>, and punishment for <u>en</u> corruption, in the Federal Executive in Brazil.

The analysis starts with the collection of secondary data, mainly government reports, figures and statistics. It includes disciplinary actions and dismissals reports for bureaucratic corruption, as well as other existing official

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information related to gender, wage, rank/status and the education levels of civil servants working for the Brazilian Federal Executive. This integration of different existing government data can lead us to a more complete and measurable portrait of those who have been were fired, as the official figures held hold by the Comptroller General Office does not offer a complete profile of those who were punished.

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There are pros and cons in using data collected by others someone else, especially by governments, ffor instance, some of the advantages of using secondary data are lower costs, time-saving and the opportunity for longitudinal analysis of a national statistics and documents are among the advantages to using secondary data (Bryman, 2008; Johnson and Reynolds, 2008). As Jupp (1989; 89) pointsed out, "fofficial statistics provide a basis for decision making by governments at national level-"(1989:89). Conversely, some scholars highlight issues linked to a lack of reliability, validity and representativeness in of this kind of data (Jupp, 1989; Arber, 2001; Bryman, 2008; De Figueiredo, 2012). As White (2010) stressesed, it is necessary to be aware conscious that there is always the possibility of government secondary data having been being manipulated for political objectives. Indeed, there might be distinct purposes than only research certain phenomenon. Thus, according to for-Maxfield and Babbie (2011), secondary data should be treated as supplementary., particularly as it Accordingly, at the same time secondary data offers the opportunity for new interpretations to be reanalysed as well as delivered to delivery new interpretations, since official government reports and files can often always be biased or represent an incomplete measurement of a unique phenomenona.

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For the purpose of this study, it is important to highlight that Brazil does not keep a unified data for with corruption cases. Those Aacts of corruption that have attracted little less or none public attention can be extremely difficult to track back and or to find their main events following them events and their consequences can be difficult to find, especially in terms of prosecution and punishments. Moreover, the Brazilian multi-institutional anti-corruption system allows public agents (civil servants and elected members of the Legislative

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Branch) who have been accused of en acts of corruption to be investigated and punished independently by both administrative committees and judicial courts (Ribeiro de Alencar and Gico Jr., 2010). Administrative punishments can happen at all levels whether in all federal, state or local levels. In addition, some attributions in judiciary courts can be compensatory or can overlap. Hence, both state and federal, or superior and lower courts can try ial at the same time similar or even exactly the same corruption cases, depending on a range of variables, such as the identity of who the defendant is and the type of illegal behaviour.

Thus, the major focus of this study major focus will only be on the administrative procedures that have resulted in punishments between 2003 and 2014 in the central administration of the Federal Executive. It was a deliberated choice of The period of time and jurisdiction was a deliberate choice, mainly because the Comptroller General Office holds an public data matrix that has already been organiszed and public data matrix. It and which offers individuallevel information on all disciplinary procedures that have resulted in both more lenient lighter and severe though punishments from 2003 onwards (the year this anti-corruption agency was created) onwards. It also covers three full presidential administrations. Besides, there is no such data information on corruption or punishments at local or state levels in Brazil. Indeed, it is a unique and very little explored data matrix that can allow for some evaluation of the whole population of federal civil servants that have been were fired in the past 12 years.

Moreover, this database compiles robust national data, without gaps, and with the same pattern (De Figueiredo, 2012), offering a level of organiszed information on punishments that neither the judiciary nor the Prosecutioner's Service has available yet yet. Nevertheless, these statistics-might are not able to offer on their own a complete portrait of the punishments for or corruption in the Federal Executive. Hence, e extra data must be added. Although these numbers can show important trends and correlations between disciplinary procedures and other variables, they might not explain the social interactions and processes in government agencies.

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